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BOO K REVIEW

Preaching to Manager§
S El\S E Al'-i D NO NSENSE IN CORPORATE fi NA NCE . By Louis Lowenstein. 1 Rea ding
Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley . 1991. Pp. viii , 26 3. $24. 95 .

Reviewed by Edward B. R ock

2

I.
Who is the appropriate role model for the corporate law academic ? Are we
case crunchers, organizing and summarizing current doctrine ? Are we corporate
engineers working to refine the system of checks and balances, of levers and
counterweights, that control and channel management's discretion? Are we social
scientists disinterestedly seeking to understand how the world of corporations works,
patiently observing, measuring and modeling? Are we historians, tracing the
doctrines and ideologies of capitalism? Are we political scientists, mapping the political choices that determine and constrain corporate structure? Are we advocates
without clients, writing briefs to persuade courts, agencies, or legislatures to reform
the law? Are we arbitrageurs, trading on the latest results of finance economics? Or
are we perhaps preachers, exhorting judges, legislators, and particularly managers
and shareholders to cleave to virtue and avoid sin?
Louis Lowenstein is one of corporate law 's very best preachers. With the credibility that comes from having practiced corporate law, having managed a major
corporation, and having written erudite law review articles replete with hundreds of
footnotes, he thunders from his bully pulpit at Columbia, that cathedral of corporate law, the home of those great preachers of yesterday, Berte and Cary. In his
latest collection of sermons, Sense and Nonsense in Corporate Finance, Professor
Lowenstein continues his ministry of common sense and hard work, preaching
primarily to corporate managers who are in danger of being led astray by the forces
of evil.
The saints in Professor Lowenstein's sermons are the hard working, no
nonsense managers and investors who know that there are no free lunches, no easy
solutions to difficult problems, and no substitutes for honesty, hard work, common
sense, and a firm grasp of accounting . Benjamin Graham and David Dodd wrote the

1. Simon H. Rifkind Professor of Finance and Law, Columbia University.
2. Assistant Professor of Law, University of Pennsylva nia Law School.
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hol y sc ripture. 3 Warre n Buffett is th e livin g exemplar of t he cardina l virtues an d
proof that one can live, even prosper, in their ligh t.
T he sinners in Lowenstein's world are the snake oil salesme n (finance economists a nd investment bankers, mostly) who peddle new fa ngled hi gh tech cu res for
old corporate a ilments, the dishonest or benighted corporate managers wh o cause
th e a ilments fo r whi ch snake oil is presented as a cure, and money man age rs and
other in ves tors who are too lazy or inept to di stingui sh good compan ies from bad ,
indexing their funds instead. Pride, greed, and sloth chara cterize their fa ilings. By
their sins, enor mou s economic devasta tion has been wrought.
The core of th e book is a series of very well told mora lity tal es. Chapter 2, Th e
R oad to Ju nk Heaven: A Tale of Three Companies , is the Pa ra ble of th e Depa rtment Stores, a striking comparison of the fortunes of three retailers, Federated
Depa rtment S tores , R.H. Macy, and May Department S tores. In 1985 , the core
businesses of the three companies looked much a like. By the time Lowenstein wrote
the book, after Federated ha d been acquired by Campeau with junk bonds, and
R.H. Macy had gone private in a management leveraged bu you t, the comparison
was ma rkedl y different. Federa ted was in Chapter 11 a nd Macy was close (subsequently to fa ll in), while May prospered at their misfortune. In a ll, according to
Low enstein, a sad and bitter "object lesso ns of the evil effects of excessive leverage"
(p. 51). 4
But the world is a complicated place, as Lowenstein consistently emphasizes.
While Macy and Federated represent bad leveraged buyouts (LBOs), Lowenstein,
in chapter 4, recognizes that LBOs can sometimes be good. As he shows in an
instructive composite fictional account, LBOs can be soundly structured a nd fair to
everyone, pa rticularly in freeing a division from the deadening hand of conglomerate management. Like finance in general, LBOs are a modestly useful corporate
structure. The crucia l ingredients, as elsewhere, are prudence a nd honesty .
If too little cash (excessive leverage) poses one temptation, too much cash
provides another. In chapters 6 through 8, Lowenstein considers the dangers of
excess cash or what some now call "free cash flow ." We hear of the evil influence of
finance economics, of the right way to grapple with the dilemma and finally are
presented with contrasting stories of saints and sinners.
Chapter 6, Cash Dividends: H ow the Business Schools Got it Wrong, is
Lowenstein's account of the nonsense of financial economics' view of dividends .
How, he asks, could finance economists take seriously Modigliani and Miller's

L. DODD & SIDNEY COTTLE. SECURITY ANALYSIS PRI NCI PLES AND
(4th ed . 1962) .
4. The compa rison, like many of Lowenstei n's other ta les, rai ses as ma ny q ues tion s as it answers .
Why was bankruptcy so costly? Is ba nkruptcy more costly in some industries th an in othe rs? Why were
so ma ny bankers so willing to fund buyouts th a t, in retrospect, made no sense? On Lowenstein 's account,
it is easy to und ersta nd how Campeau, a bad merchant a nd a bad financier , failed. It is easy to und erstand why a great merch andiser like Farrell of May Depa rtment Stores succeeded. But what about
Macy? How is it that a first rate merch a nt like Finkelstein failed? Why did the new Macy iss ue so muc h
debt a nd so littl e eq uit y? Why did soph ist ica ted investors like G E Capita l, Goldman Sachs, Laurence
Tisc h, a nd Mu tu a l Sha r es not requir e Macy to maintain a stronger capit al base? To say tha t Macy is a n
obj ec t lesson of the evil effec ts of excessive leve rag e may be to beg th e most int e resting quest ions.
3.
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(MM) irrelevance thesis" when everyone with an ounce of common sense re a lizes
that the amount of excess cash in the corporation will inevitably affect investment
policy? How arrogant and unseemly for finance economists to describe the real
world's concern for dividends and changes in dividend policy as "irrational
prej udice" 6 or "optical illusion" (p. 119, n.l1). 7 Worse even than this hubris is the
patina of respectability that MM gives to management's obvious preference to keep
dividends as low as possible. If, as MM assert, dividend policy is irrelevant to sha re
price and, moreover , tax foolish, why not just let management keep th e money?
Having, he thinks, disposed of finance economics as a source of wisdom, 8
Lowenstein turns in Chapter 7 to what he sees as the central issue, namely , "to keep
the money or pay it out, that is the question" (p . 121). In doing so, Lowenstein
highlights the danger of not paying dividends (namely, that management will waste
the money), by recourse to some instructive tales. He quantifies the enormous cost
to shareholders of the failed diversification programs of the former Na tional Steel
(which left the steel business about which it knew something and lost $42.45 per
share in businesses about which it apparently knew nothing) and Nortek (a defense
contractor that launched a Drexel junk bond financed diversification effort).
But one can fall into sin even while sticking to a core business . For Lowenstein,
mining companies provide an illustration: "[p]erhaps they were overexposed as children to the Con Ed signs in New York, 'Dig we must' " (p. 125). Mining executives
know mining and love mining and seem unable to resist the temptation to spend the
earnings of the few good years when prices are high on new mines, rather than
treating them as windfalls and paying them out to shareholders . Cases in point are
Hecla Mining (boasting that it owned the largest silver mine in the country which,
unfortunately, was also losing money) and Denison Mines (which proclaimed that
"carving a mine out of the wilderness . . . [is] a highly precise science and a finely
tuned art").
But, of course, sometimes investing in core businesses is warranted, as in the
case of Caterpillar, long a world leader in earth-moving equipment. Lowenstein
lauds its determination to forego immediate gain and to invest vast sums in
defending its franchise against Japanese competition.
Chapter 8 continues the discussion of dividends, turning to one means of paying
out free cash flow, the corporate share repurchase. Lowenstein provides marvelous
contrasting accounts of Exxon, which has paid out a huge amount of free cash flow
through share repurchases, and American Express, which has dissipated vast sums

5. The irrelevance thesis asserts that dividend policy is irrelevant to stock prices if markets are
perfect, future investments, profits, and dividends are known by the firm with certa inty, and in ves tment
policy is fixed ahead of time and unaltered by changes in dividend policy. STEPHEN A. Ross &
RANDOLPH W. WESTERFIELD. CORPORATE fiNANCE 405 (1988).
6. Lowenstein cites RICHARD A. BREALEY & STEWART C MYERS. PRI NC IPLES OF CORPORATE
fiNANCE 350 (3d ed. 1988).
7. Lowenstein cites Merton Miller, Can Management Use Dividends to Influ ence the Value of the
Firm?, in THE REVOL UTIO N IN CORPORATE FI:-IA NC E 299 (Joel M. Stern & Donald H. Chew, Jr. eds.,
1986).
8. See infra text accompanying notes 21-24.
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in unsuccessful diversification. By Lowenstein's calculation, American Express,
blessed with one of the great corporate franchises, the American Express Card and
Traveler's Checks, wasted more than half of shareholders' value in its vain attempt
to become a global financial supermarket.
In the end, Lowenstein 's advice on free cash flow is similar to his advice on
every other hard question of corporate finance. There are no easy answers. General
rul es and models do not work . Instead , one must make th e decision patiently and
wisely, only investing free cash flow when management truly , honestly, and skeptically believes that doing so will create at least a doll a r of value for a dollar of
retained earnings. If management is honest, intelligent, and knows its own limits, it
will generally do a pretty good job.
In a final chapter, Lowenstein turns his attention to shareholders, a topic on
which he spent more time in his first book. 9 Here the saints are the good, useful
shareholders (like Pierre DuPont in GM and Warren Buffett in everything he owns)
who are wise and patient, providing stability, counseling, and direction to management. Such shareholders have la rge enoug h stakes that it is in their interests to
become involved in the company, looking out for the interests of all shareholders in
looking out for their own interests. The sinners are those shareholders who trade
constantly and who snap up any premium bid that comes their way, "unwilling to
recognize any responsibility that [goes] beyond immediate market gains" (p. 220).
But how do the large institutional investors who index a substantial portion of
their portfolios fit into this moral landscape? On the one hand, they do not trade,
and thus can credibly claim a long term interest in their portfolio companies. But
how can they claim to "resemble a Warren Buffett, who invests Berkshire
Hathaway's capital in large sums, in only a handful of companies, each of which he
carefully selects and monitors" (p. 222). Here Lowenstein is unsure. While urging
investors to become more like Warren Buffett, he also recognizes that passive
indexing is likely to be the most profitable course for large investors. Much as he
would like the indexers to assume a Buffett-like role, he recognizes that the major
cost advantage of indexing leaves little margin for the monitoring and discipline of
management of portfolio companies. As he puts it, "two basis points, or even four,
do not buy much corporate oversight" (p. 228). Only time will tell whether
CalPERS is a saint or a sinner.
Lowenstein also devotes chapters to criticizing stock splits and stock dividends,
and to decrying what he sees as the pernicious nonsense of using the capital asset
pricing model for internal corporate capital budgeting. Throughout, he does a
marvelous job presenting technical financial issues in plain language. He constantly
emphasizes the importance of financial accounting, and how much an insightful
reader can learn from publicly available disclosure documents. Lowenstein also
effectively discusses "funny money," pay-in-kind, and zero coupon junk bonds that
appeared in the waning years of the 1980s takeover boom.

9.

LOUI S LO W ENSTEII' , WHAT'S WRONG
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II.
What is one to make of these tales? In Lowenstein's rendition, the stories of
Federated, Macy, National Steel, Nortek, Hecla Mines, Denison Mining, and
American Express are pretty awful. 'vVe can all supplement the list of sinners. Likewise, the saints are pretty inspiring . If only my folks had given me 100 shares of
Warren Buffett's Berkshire Hathaway for my eighth birthday in 1964 when it was
trading at $16 per share or so, shares that are now worth around $8,000 each!
In reflecting on these stories, one should be struck by the ineffectiveness of the
various market restraints in rooting out sin. The hyperactive market for corporate
control did nothing to prevent American Express from frittering away its shareholders' money. The public debt markets failed to restrain FederatedjCampeau or
Macy from their headlong plunge to their deaths. Indeed, they egged them on. The
market for managers did nothing to prevent the ill advised diversification pursued
by National Steel and Nortek and countless other conglomerates. Competitive
product markets did little to constrain the unprofitable expansion and exploration by
Hecla and Denison. While all these firms undoubtedly had the most up to date and
elaborate incentive compensation schemes, managers still went badly wrong.
The legal and institutional checks, little mentioned by Lowenstein, fared no
better. Boards of Directors have stood idly by while bad decision was piled upon bad
decision. Derivative suits provided no check. Proxy fights were hardly a blip on the
screen. The courts were entirely absent. Behavior that, in retrospect and in Lowenstein's rendition, constituted gross violations of the duty of care went unadjudicated.
The horror stories clearly show the limited extent to which either market or institutional or legal mechanisms constrain management discretion.
At the same time, the structure of constraints on management discretion does
little to explain the success of the saints. Many of those responsible for the saints'
sterling performances would have personally done just as well, or perhaps better,
had they worked less hard or frittered away the shareholders' money. But they did
not do so.
This is a more general point. I am not alone in the uneasy sense I have at the
end of the basic corporations course or a seminar on corporate governance. The
market, institutional, and legal constraints that limit and channel management
discretion, and on which we spend so much time, seem so impotent. 1 ° Can it be that
corporate law is really about what it at least superficially seems to be about? Can it
really be about perfecting an array of sticks and carrots, of constraints and incentives, that align managements' interests with those of the shareholders?
If neither markets, courts, nor institutional structures provide robust checks on
management discretion, how is it that managers, on the whole, seem to do a pretty
good job and millions entrust their savings to corporations? Likewise, we need to
explain how it is that some managers go astray. In other words, what distinguishes
the saints from the sinners?

10. for a probing and comprehensive discussion of the ineffectiveness of market, legal, and institutional restraints, see CHRISTOPHER D. STONE, WHERE THE LAW ENDS: THE SOCIAL CONTROL OF
CORPORATE BEHAVIOR (197 5).
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One a nswer, it seems to me, starts from the recogni tion that ma nagers, like th e
rest of us, generally try to do their best. I prepare for cl ass fo r a whole variety of
reasons: because I get pleasure out of doing the best I ca n, because I am embarrassed to appear before my students unprepared, because I fee l a sense of obligation
to m y stud ents , because my colleagues value preparati on, beca use I want to get
tenur e. I would expect that most corporate managers wor k hard fo r a similar vari ety
of reasons: becau se doing a good job is often pleasurabl e, beca use of a sense of
obliga tion to coworkers, because it is the right thing to do, beca use they want to
keep their jobs. We are all motiva ted a nd constrained mu ch t11ore by social norms
tha n we a re by markets, institutional structures, or laws.
In Lowenstein's tales, the good managers had a clea re r a nd better view of wh a t
their jobs were and of how they should perform them. They realized that they were
stewards of other people's money and that they should not spend it, either in
acquiring new businesses or in investing in the core business, unless they were darn
sure that it would benefit shareholders . They realized th a t their jobs were to build
strong compa nies , not to engage in financial manipulation for personal gain, nor to
cave in to pressure from short term investors for a quick profit. 11 They were humble,
reali zing that paying out excess cash to the shareholders was a source of pride, not
shame . They realized that the wealth of the country is generated by people who get
their hands dirty in unspectacular places like Toledo, not fl ash y financiers in places
like Wall Street. They realized that the significance of financ e pales in comparison
to research, development, and manufacturing.
If we take this explanation seriously, it becomes clearer what Lou Lowenstein
is all about. He is in the business of generating and reinforcing norms for managers
and shareholders, a task that explains the deeply normative character of his writing
on corporate law. Contrasting narratives of saints and sinners, parables, inspirational and cautionary tales, are all classic means of establishing standards, of
shaping conduct. Whenever I turn to Lowenstein's work, I am immediately struck
by the extent to which he transforms corporate law into a bra nch of public morality.
This perspective also provides the most intelligible account of what it is that the
Delaware courts do. In the long and rich narratives that form a very large part of
every opinion, the Delaware courts can best be understood as providing us with
contrasting tales of good and bad behavior, and as providing, by means of these

I
l

I
'

I

I;t

II. Consider Lowenstein's moral vision, expressed through the words of Charles E . O'Rourke, his
hypothetical CEO:
"[A company] is a social institution-one of some importance .. . An institution organized for profit but a social one nonetheless .. . Good, fairly priced drugs are the reason we
exist. Shareholders have a role in that scheme . They contribute capita l, and they are entitled (by dividends and price appreciation) to the profits. They are entitled to monitor
management and to intervene, if necessary, to be sure that management is competent and
honest. But stock price appreciation is the consequence, the mere reflection, of a successful
enterprise, rather than the overriding objective.
"The rhetoric of private property tends to obscure thi s bas ic di stinction . . . .
[Through " greed factors"] we tempt people to become indi vidua ll y richer even though th eir
compa nies a nd society are left poor (pp. 62-63).

j
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illustrative a ccounts, fundamental pieces of the job descriptions of corporate directors, managers, and coun sel. Fortun ately, the Delaware courts usually tell the
stories well: in reading and teaching th e cases, I can almost always remember the
stories, even when 1 have difficulty distilling the principles of law.
Thin k fir st of the sinn ers. We are trou bled by the able but uninformed d irectors
in S mith v. Van Gorkom , who couldn 't be bothered to act with due care before
lett ing th e chairman and C EO sell the company for what we are told was an inadequate price. 1 2 In Unocal, we are asked to frown at the despicable attempt by T.
Boone Pickens to take over the company (or extort greenmail) by the clever but evil
" two-tier, front-end-loaded, classically coercive, bust-up, junk-bond-fueled tend er
offer. " 1 3 In R ev/on, we are asked to shudder at the spectacle of Michel Bergerac
and the directors neglecting the interests of their shareholders because of Bergerac's
"s trong personal antipathy" for Ronald Perelman, or out of a craven desire to avoid
liability to bondholders. 14 In A-fills, we condemn the management team 's transparent attempts to steal the company, and the directors' divided loyalties that led
them to fa il to provide any serious oversight.~~
And consider the saints. We admire Peter Atkins who so ably kept RJR
Nabisco's special committee focused on the interests of shareholders after their
CEO sought to buy the company. 16 We are urged to respect Time's directors, who
followed their well documented, comprehensive long range strategic plan, modifying
the structure of the transaction to protect their shareholders from the threat posed
to the corporate enterprise by Paramount's uninvited offer. 17 We are meant to
applaud the eight independent outside directors of Unocal who, after meeting separately with Unocal's financial advisers and attorneys, rejected Mesa's "grossly
inadequate" tender offer and subsequently directed a proportional response to
Picken's threat to their shareholders .18 The Delaware Chancellor's non-judicial
speeches and writings are often of a similar character. 19
What makes these contrasting narratives even more compelling is that the
Delaware courts name names. The opinions collectively create a hall of honor and a
hall of shame. Managers and lawyers reading them first or second hand must reflect
upon the prospect of public praise or censure. One hears anecdotes of the fury of
those who believe that they have been unjustly maligned by the Delaware courts.
To say that Lowenstein, like the Delaware courts, is in the business of generating and enforcing norms for corporate management and shareholders, states

12.
13.

Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985); Andrew G.T. Moore, II, The
J980s-Did We Save The Stockholders While the Corporation Burned? , 70 WASH. U L.Q. 277, 282
( 1992) .
14. Revlon v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, 506 A .2d 173, 176 (Del. 1986).
15. Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1265 (Del. 1988).
16. In re RJR Nabisco Shareholder Litig ., [ 1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
~ 94,194 (Del. Ch . 1989) .
17. Paramount v. Time, 571 A.2d 1140, 1153 (Del. 1989) .
18. Unoca l Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 950 (Del. 1985).
19. See. e. g. , William T . Allen, Independent Directors in MBO Transactions: Are They Fact or
Fantasy?, 45 Bus. LAW. 2055 (1990).
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rather than answers the more fundamental and contested question: W hat should the
content of those norms be'l How do we (as citizens or as shareholders) want corporate managers and shareholders to behave? Much of the heat in Lowenstein's
writing, here and elsewhere, seems to me to derive from a deep felt commitment to
a particular set of norms that he seeks to further against a competing set that claim
support from the results of finance economics. He sets forth twelve "Basic Rules or
Principles," norms illustrated in his accounts of saints and sinners (pp. 8-12). In
Lowenstein's view, he is defending the traditional virtues of patience, hard work,
and humility against corporate finance's siren song of easy money and vast gains
from "financial engineering ."
Characterizing saints and sinners is tricky. For some, the saints of Lowenstein's
or the Delaware courts' tales are sinners of the worst sort. Similarly the sinners,
while perhaps somewhat unsavory, may be seen as heroic upon further reflection. As
one relatively uncharged example of the difficulty, consider Lowenstein's reverence
for Graham and Dodd. It is far from obvious that we want the money managers
who control the large institutional investors to be Graham/Dodd "value investors."
Given the enormous volume of empirical evidence that active management, with its
attendant trading and management costs, consistently underperforms the market
indices, indexing should perhaps be viewed not as sloth but as the efficient and
prudent stewardship of other people's money. If monitoring management with a
Buffett-like intensity does not improve portfolio performance, it is not at all clear
that we, either as pension fund participants or as citizens, really want to encourage
such behavior C~.mong institutional investors. Maybe yes, maybe no, but one cannot
look to commcm sense alone for the answer.
Similarly, common sense cannot provide the answers to a host of other fundamental normative and at least partly empirical questions that underpin our
judgments of virtue and sin. Whether the LBO form is superior to the publicly held
corporation, as Michael Jensen claims, depends at least in part on whether bankruptcy costs are large or smal l. 20 Whether hostile tender offers are to be encouraged
or decried depends, at least in part, on whether they create wealth or destroy it.
Whether corporate diversification is generally wise or foolish depends, at least in
part, on whether diversification can be achieved more efficiently at the firm level or
at the portfolio level.
Lowenstein's hostility to the normative conclusions that some derive from
finance economics interferes with an appreciation of the substantial contributions
that it makes to corporate law and business practice. Take, for example, his treatment of the Modigliani and Miller irrelevance theorem. To Lowenstein, this
epitomizes the nonsense of finance economics.
But Lowenstein's shot flies wide of its mark. Of course MM does not describe
the real world: it is a model of the polar case. What makes the Modigliani-Miller
thesis so seminal is that it sets the stage for subsequent analysis. As one recent

20. Michael C. Jensen, Eclipse of the Public Corporation, HARV Bus. REv., Sept.-Oct. 1989, at
61. For a response, see Alfred Rappaport, The Staying Power of the Public Corporation, HARY. Bus.
REv., Jan.- Feb. 1990, at 96.
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study explains, the "'dividend irrelevance proposition' has led to much subsequent
resea rch focusing on two rel ated issues~the tax effects of dividend yield on stock
valuation and the explanation for the observed price reactions to dividend
an nouncements." 21
Fina nce economists have long recognized that the market does not find dividends irrelevant. 22 The challenge is to figure out what features best explain this
be havior . In deed , Lowenstei n' s favo red explanation, that excess cas h will alter the
inves tment plans, has been extens ivel y discussed by economists. 23 Even the basic
finance textbooks that Lowenstein ci tes as the source of th e confusion include references to the various expl a nations for dividends, including a gency cost expl a nations. 24
The fact tha.t the introductory finance texts spend so much time discussing the basic
MM model does not mean th a t the texts are teaching students that the model
describes the real world. Rather, it reflects how difficult it is to teach an abstract
model.
While I am ignorant and th erefore agnostic on whether MM and the literature
it spawned has value in the business context, its "modestly useful" promise, like that
of much else in corpora te finance , is to make more rigorous the application of
common sense. As Lowenstein himself explains, dividend policy must be set with an
eye both to the financing needs of the firm, the demands of the market, and tax
consequences (pp. 121-43) . The MM literature potentially provides a model for
tying these competing considerations together, a method of thinking about them in a
systematic fashion.
Lowenstein, although acknowledging corporate finance or finance economics as
a "modestly useful discipline," spends little time exploring its uses (p. 22). I, at
least, am grateful that a branch of economics devotes its efforts to gathering and
analyzing the data fundamental to corporate law . In this regard , corporate law
academics are far better off than our colleagues in , say, bankruptcy, who have had
to learn to collect such critical data themselves. 2 ° Corporate finance may only be a

21. Mukesh Bajaj & Anand M. Yijh, Dividend Clienteles and the Information Content of Dividend Changes, 26 J FIN. ECON. 193 (1990).
22 . See, e.g., Eugene Fama, Lawrence Fisher, Michael C. Jensen & Richard Roll, The Adjustment of Stock Prices to New Information , 10 INT'L Eco N. REv. I (1969); R. Richardson Pettit,
Dividend Announcements, S ecurity Performance. and Capiwl Markets Efficiency , 27 J. FI N. 993 ( 1972);
Joseph Aharony & ltzhak Swary, Quarterly Dividend and Earnings Announcements and Stockholders'
Returns: An Empirical Analysis, 35 J. FI N. I (1980).
23. See, e.g., Larry H.P. Lang & Robert H. Litzenberger, Dividend Announcements: Cash Flow
S ignaling vs. Free Cash Flow Hypothesis ?, 24 J. FIN. EcoN. 181 (1989); Michael C. Jensen, Agency
Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers, 76 AM. EcoN. REv. 323 ( 1986); Frank H.
Easterbrook, Two Agency Cost Explanations of Dividends, 74 AM. EcoN. REv. 650 (1984); Michael
Rozeff, How Companies Set Their Dividend Payout Ratios, in THE REVOLUTION IN CORPORATE
FINANCE 320 (Joel M. Stern & Donald H. Chew, Jr. eds., 1986); Michael S. Rozeff, Growth, Beta and
Agency Costs as Determinations of Dividend Payout Ratios, 5 l FIN . REs. 249 ( 1982); Bajaj & Vijh ,
supra note 21, at 214-17.
24. See, e.g., Ross & WESTERFIE LD, supra note 5, at 416-19; RICHARD A BREALEY & STEWART
C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 382-83 (4th ed. 1991) .
25. See, e.g. , TERESA A. S ULLIVAN, ELIZABETH WARRE N & JAY \VESTBROOK. As WE fORGIVE
OUR DEBTORS BA NKRUPTCY AND CONSUMER CREDIT iN AME RI CA ( 1989).
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"modestly useful discipline," but that is not so shabby. Corporate law, in either its
academi c or law firm incarnations , can hardl y claim more.
Th e very best sermons leave you thinking. They inspire, they amuse, they
inform, the y ca ution , they disturb, they provoke. In Sense and No nsense, Louis
Lowenstei n does all these and more. Read th e book.

